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Where Can Unconscionability Take
Arbitration? Why the Fifth Circuit's
Conscience Was Only Partially
Shocked
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC 1
I. INTRODUCTION
As a means of countering the pro-arbitration stance taken by the Supreme
Court, a number of lower courts have chosen to police the fairness of arbitration
clauses in contracts by using the doctrine of unconscionability.2 The Supreme
Court has authorized the use of generally applicable contract law principles-
including unconscionability-to invalidate arbitration agreements.3 Unconscion-
ability provides courts with a flexible tool for coming to the rescue of parties who,
if the court is sufficiently shocked, find themselves entangled in unfair arbitration
clauses. This Note addresses the Fifth Circuit's use of unconscionability in re-
spect to a particularly one-sided arbitration clause, and examines the court's fail-
ure to utilize unconscionability regarding other aspects of the contracts' arbitration
clauses.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
In September 2001, a group of cellular telephone customers filed suit in Lou-
isiana state court against four service providers and their respective local agents-
Cingular Wireless (Cingular), Sprint Spectrum (Sprint), Centennial Beauregard
Cellular (Centennial) and Telecorp Communications, Inc.4 The original suit in-
cluded causes of action for breach of contract and violation of the Louisiana Un-
fair Trade Practices Act.5 Although some of the contracts included arbitration
provisions and some did not, when the plaintiffs began to pursue claims that in-
volved contracts containing arbitration clauses, Cingular, Sprint and Centennial
filed motions to compel arbitration and stay the judicial proceedings.6
1. 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp.
RESOL. 757, 802 (2004).
3. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
4. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 162. However, Telecorp Communications was not a part of the appeal before
the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 162 n. 1.
5. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1401-1430 (West 2003).
6. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 162.
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In 1999, the Iberia Parish Sheriff's Department, using Walter Dodge as its
purchasing agent, opened a multi-telephone account with Centennial. 7 The origi-
nal agreement did not contain any arbitration clauses.8 During the next few years,
extra phones were added periodically including a final phone added on October
24, 2002.9 To add this phone to the existing plan, Dodge signed a standard-form
service agreement. 10 The back of the form included an arbitration clause which
stated:
Dispute Resolution; Waiver of Trial by Jury; Waiver of Class Actions-
Please read this section carefully. It affects rights that you may otherwise
have. It provides for resolution of most disputes through arbitration in-
stead of court trials and class actions .... You agree that instead of suing
in court, you will arbitrate any and all disputes and claims arising out of
this Agreement .... t
All other clauses contained in the arbitration provision used "you and we"
language. 12 Plaintiff Sid Hebert, Sheriff of Iberia Parish, sued Centennial as a
representative of the sheriffs department. 13 Both Dodge and Hebert testified that
they did not negotiate the terms and were not told of the arbitration clause, which
had not been included in any of the previous agreements with Centennial. 14 The
Centennial contract also contained a severability clause the court deemed inade-
quate to repair the damage the arbitration clause had caused to the contract. 15
As to the agreements with Cingular, plaintiffs Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., Con-
stance Louviere, and Wardell Gerhardt all signed standard form contracts, which
explicitly incorporated Cingular's Terms and Conditions. 16  The Terms and
Conditions were printed on the back of the form or on a separate pamphlet that
accompanied the form. The plaintiffs all signed the form agreeing to be bound to
the Terms and Conditions.'7 The agreement provided that "any and all disputes"
7. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 162 (5th Cir. 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
12. Id. The Centennial agreement continued as follows:
Even if applicable law provides otherwise, you and we each waive our right to a trial by jury and
to participate in class actions .... By this agreement, both you and we are waiving certain rights
to litigate disputes in court. If for any reason this arbitration clause is deemed inapplicable or in-
valid, you and we both waive, to the fullest extent allowed by law, any claims to recovery puni-
tive or exemplary damages and any right to pursue any claims on a class or consolidated basis or
in a representative capacity.
Id. (alteration in original).
13. Id. at 162.
14. Id. at 163.
15. Id. at 171. Centennial's severability clause provided that "if any portion of this arbitration
agreement is determined by a court to be inapplicable or invalid, the remainder shall still be given full
force and effect." Id. The court determined that it would be impossible to strike a "certain offensive
term" from an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate, which is the purpose of severability clauses. Id.
In order to remedy the situation, the contract would have to be redrafted and new provisions added
including the duty of Centennial to arbitrate. Id.
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would be arbitrated, and that the parties "agree that no arbitrator has the authority
to ... order consolidation or class arbitration" and that neither party "may disclose
the existence, content or results of any arbitration."' 8 Furthermore, the Terms and
Conditions also provided that Cingular could change any terms, conditions, rates,
or fees at any time, although a customer had the option to cancel service if such a
change was implemented, without being subject to an early termination fee.' 9
Lastly, the Terms and Conditions contained a severability clause.
20
Similarly, Sprint, in its agreement with Charles Landry, provided that "any
claim, controversy or dispute" would be settled through arbitration as prescribed
by the Terms and Conditions. 21 Although the Terms and Conditions did not call
for a signature, they were deemed accepted upon activation of the customer's
account.2 Sprint's Terms and Conditions provided that no discovery would be
permitted in the arbitration, except that the parties would exchange (thirty days
prior to their hearing) the materials they were submitting to the arbitrator.2 3 In
addition, Sprint reserved the right to change the agreement at any time by publish-
ing new Terms and Conditions, which were considered accepted when the cus-
tomer paid a bill or used the Sprint services after the date of the change.24 Finally,
like the other companies, the Sprint agreement included a severability clause.25
The companies removed the case from Louisiana state court to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana on the basis of diver-
sity.26 Once in the district court, the companies moved to compel arbitration of
the dispute through the agreed-upon arbitration clauses and the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).27 The district court denied the motions to compel arbitration on the
grounds that the plaintiffs had not agreed to the arbitration clauses.28 The court
found that the agreements placed "all the benefit to the company and none to the
consumer" thereby making them unconscionable under Louisiana law. 29 The
companies brought an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
30
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Centennial's motion to
compel arbitration. 31 In keeping with recent Louisiana appellate cases, the court
18. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 164 n.5. The court did not rule on this issue because Plaintiff Landry failed to raise this
matter in the district court, and it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 176.
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 162.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 165.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Fifth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1), which "permits immediate appeals of district court orders denying requests to com-
pel arbitration and to stay litigation." Id. (citing Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 536
(5th Cir. 2003) and 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2004)). Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that
the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction whenever the district court determines that the parties did not form a
binding agreement to arbitrate. Id. However, the district court's decision in this case being based on
unconscionability and failure of mutual assent, combined with the statutory basis, resulted in the denial
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Id.
31. Id. at 171.
20051
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found that the "one-sidedness of the duty to arbitrate raises a serious question as to
the clause's validity" when an arbitration clause binds only the customer to arbi-
tration and leaves a loophole for the party that crafted the clause to pursue arbitra-
tion or to litigate the claim. 32 However, the court found that the district court
erred in denying Cingular's and Sprint's motions to compel arbitration. 33 In doing
so, the court failed to find that any of the fine print arguments, change-in-terms
clauses, bar on class actions and confidentiality agreements rose to the level to
warrant the use of unconscionability.
34
Carefully noting that federal courts must exercise extreme caution when
electing to invalidate arbitration clauses, the Fifth Circuit used the doctrine of
unconscionability to invalidate a one-sided arbitration agreement, as to defendant,
Centennial. Although the court declined to be so generous regarding the other
clauses used by defendants, Cingular and Sprint.
I1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A major goal of the FAA was to eliminate the judicial system's historic hos-
tility toward arbitration agreements.35 Section 2 of the FAA requires courts to
treat arbitration agreements the same as any other contract. This requirement also
applies to a court's determination of unconscionability. 36 Section 2 requires that
arbitration agreements "be enforced unless they are invalid under principles of
state law that govern all other contracts. 37 The United States Supreme Court, in
Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, authorized that "generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening section 2 [of the FAA]." 38
Simply because a court uses a general principle of contract law, such as un-
conscionability, to void an arbitration clause, does not guarantee that the state law
decision is valid under the FAA. 39 Essentially, state courts cannot target arbitra-
tion provisions where they would not otherwise apply the same legal theory to
other contract provisions. 4° In the little bit of guidance provided, the Supreme
Court has warned lower courts that in examining arbitration agreements, the
courts may not "construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which
it otherwise construes non arbitration agreements under state law."4 1 Similarly,
the Court has also prohibited lower courts from concluding that "a contract is fair
32. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 2004).
33. Id. at 162.
34. Id. at 172-76.
35. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). The language of Section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exists at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
37. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 166.
38. 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). The court noted that, as an example, courts could not declare the
clauses invalid unless they contained a special notice on the front page. Id.
39. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 167.
40. Id.
41. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
[Vol. I
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enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to
enforce its arbitration clause."42
The Supreme Court's treatment of arbitration has not been consistent since
the passage of the FAA in 1925.43 From 1926-1960, arbitration received "only
partial judicial support" with courts carving out exceptions to arbitration. 44 It was
not until the 1960s and 1970s that the Court's support for arbitration began to
slowly burgeon, albeit with some occasional setbacks. 45  By the mid-1980s, "a
series of cases ... changed both the 'meaning' of the FAA" and how it was ap-
plied.46 This trend expressed the Court's move toward supporting arbitration as a
means of dealing with what was perceived as the backlog of litigation in the
courts. 47 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the Court justi-
fied the trade-off between arbitration and litigation, extolling the benefits of arbi-
tration, noting that the plaintiff "trades the procedures and opportunity for review
of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. 48
In the landmark arbitration case Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court
definitively held that the FAA applied in state as well as federal court. 49 Further,
42. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
43. Stempel, supra note 2, at 769, 773.
44. Id. at 773. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956). The Bern-
hardt court held that the FAA only applied to cases in federal court and that state courts were not
bound to compel arbitration. Id. at 203. The court expressed its fear that, "If the federal court allows
arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the
courthouse where suit is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings,
substantially affects the cause of action created by the [sitate." Id. Earlier, in Wilko v. Swan, the court
found that a claim brought pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 was not subject to arbitration. 346
U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485
(1989). The Court, even "[r]ecognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may
provide for the solution of commercial controversies," concluded "that the intention of Congress con-
cerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration
of issues arising under the [Securities] Act." Id. at 438.
45. Stempel, supra note 2, at 773-775. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In particular, the three
cases of the Steelworker's Trilogy were considered a boost for arbitration because the Court held that
uncertainties in the language of arbitration provisions were to be constructed in favor of arbitration.
Stempl, supra note 2, at 773. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (hold-
ing that the petitioner was not precluded from exercising his independent statutory rights under Title
VII after an arbitrator had already ruled on the issue, and noting that federal courts were a better forum
than arbitration for Title VII disputes).
46. Stempel, supra note 2, at 776.
47. Id. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The Moses
H. court noted that, "Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements .... The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Id. See
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that in enacting Section 2 of the FAA,
"Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration"); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987) (invoking the Supremacy Clause to find
that the FAA preempted a California statute that required a judicial forum for resolving wage dis-
putes); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,485 (1989) (holding that the
FAA applied to statutory claims).
48. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
49. Keating, 465 U.S. at 10, 16 (referring to the FAA and noting that "[in creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements"). Id.
2005]
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the Court noted that lower courts must heed the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration and must resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration. 50 Throughout
the 1990s and into the next decade, the Court continued to support arbitration
provisions, "finding little that might invalidate [them]." 5'
In the late 1990s, while the Supreme Court adhered to its pro-arbitration
stance, some lower courts began to apply general contract law as a way "of deter-
mining the force of arbitration clauses. 52 In 2000, the California Supreme Court
decided Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,53 which "is per-
haps the best known of [the] new generation of cases." 54 In Armendariz, the court
determined that a one-sided arbitration provision was unconscionable in that it
required employees-but not the employer-to arbitrate.55  The California Su-
preme Court based its holding in Armendariz on lack of mutuality, but also named
a number of other factors that could be examined to determine unconscionability,
including: limitation of remedies, adequate discovery, judicial review of the arbi-
tration decisions and payment of arbitration fees.56 Although Armendariz was not
the first case 57 to apply unconscionability to invalidate an arbitration agreement, it
is considered one of the more notable cases at the forefront of this trend.
58
The California Supreme Court's decision in Armendariz serves as a good ex-
ample of the trend among other courts to use unconscionability as a way to invali-
date arbitration clauses. For instance, the Ninth Circuit looked to Armendariz
when deciding Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, concluding that, under California law,
a one-sided contract to arbitrate between an employer and an employee "raises a
rebuttable presumption of substantive unconscionability. ' 59 This ruling suggests
50. Id. at 16.
51. Stempel, supra note 2, at 782. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (hold-
ing that class treatment of claims are permitted if the arbitrator determines such and the treatment is
not prohibited by the text itself); Pacificare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (reversing the
Eleventh Circuit's decision which held that an arbitration agreement may not preclude arbitrators from
considering a possible award of treble damages); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 272 (1995) (giving the FAA a broad reading and enforcing an arbitration clause by finding that it
applied to all disputes involving commerce and that language about interstate commerce in the FAA
was not an exemption for states to apply anti-arbitration state laws); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996) (reversing a judgment of the Montana Supreme Court and finding that it was
in direct conflict with the FAA and that the FAA preempted conflicting state law).
52. Stempel, supra note 2, at 799.
53. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
54. Stempel, supra note 2, at 799-800.
55. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 888-89.
56. See id. at 682-89.
57. Broemmer v. Abortion Servs., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). The Arizona Supreme
Court used unconscionability as a means of invalidating an arbitration agreement coupled with the
coercive setting in which the agreement was signed, but declined to analyze the unconscionability of
the contract specifically. Id. at 1017.
58. Stempel, supra note 2, at 799-800.
59. 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit went on to note that "[ulnless the em-
ployer can demonstrate that the effect of a contract to arbitrate is bilateral-as is required by California
law-with respect to a particular employee, courts should presume such contracts substantively uncon-
scionable." Id. See also Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003) (refusing
to enforce one way trial de novo provisions in an arbitration clause drafted only in favor of the insurer
if an award was in excess of $20,000, and determining that such provisions violated public policy and
were thus unconscionable); McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 337 F.3d 697, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding
that an employer's exclusive control over the pool of potential arbitrators rendered the forum for arbi-
tration so one-sided that it effectively prevented the employee from vindicating her statutory rights
[Vol. I
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one extreme of a court's willingness to take unconscionability to a new level. On
the other hand, the Third Circuit, in Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., found
that an arbitration clause that bound only the plaintiffs was still enforceable be-
cause as long as consideration was present, mutuality was not a requirement.
6°
Reflecting a different view, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that lack of
mutuality is only a factor to be considered, among other things, in determining
whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable.
61
Unconscionability is generally recognized as an acceptable means of invali-
dating an arbitration provision. However, courts certainly vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction in their use of the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitra-
tion agreements.62
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit was charged with determining whether
four arbitration clauses were unconscionable and thereby unenforceable.63 In
determining whether unconscionability could be used to invalidate any of the
arbitration clauses, the court noted that the clauses could not be subjected to any
greater scrutiny than any other contract provision would normally receive under
the FAA.64 Thus, the court entered the analysis looking for violations under gen-
eral provisions of Louisiana contract law.65 The court also noted that although it
assumed that state courts would follow federal law, as a federal court, it must be
particularly careful "when applying state decisions that strike down arbitration
clauses as unconscionable."
66
In examining whether an arbitration agreement might be unconscionable,
both state and federal law must be considered. 67 The Fifth Circuit began this in-
quiry by examining the substantive Louisiana state law that governs unconscion-
under Title VII, thereby nullifying the enforcement of the pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate the statu-
tory claims); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003) (holding that the legal remedies
portion of the agreement was unconscionable under California law); Samek v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 793 N.E.2d 62, 65-66 (Il. Ct. App. 2003).
60. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 182-84 (3d. Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit also
determined that the clause was not unconscionable because it was on the back side of the document or
because the parties did not have equal bargaining power. Id. at 182.
61. Exparte Parker, 730 So. 2d 168, 171 (Ala. 1999). Still, the court found that lack of mutuality of
remedy alone was not sufficient to support a claim of unconscionability. Id. See also Doctor's Assocs.
v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that there was no fraudulent inducement into
arbitration and that the agreement was not unconscionable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a pre-printed insert that included an arbitration clause created
an agreement to arbitrate when the package was opened and the customer used the product); Farrell v.
Convergent Communs., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17314 at *14 (N.D. Cal Oct. 29, 1998) (holding
that adequate consideration existed to support an agreement to arbitrate when an employer's promise to
continue to employ former employee was made in exchange for former employee's assent to the arbi-
tration agreement).
62. Stempel, supra note 2, at 801.
63. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 2004).
64. Id. at 166.
65. Id. at 167.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 166.
2005]
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ability in contracts. 68 Although there are no statutory provisions directly address-
ing the issue in the Louisiana Civil Code, Louisiana case law does recognize that
contracts possessing both "adhesionary formation and unduly harsh substance"
can be invalidated due to unconscionability.
69
The Fifth Circuit took the various clauses and grouped them together, so that
they could examine the similar provisions in each defendant's agreement. 70 Be-
cause it found Centennial's one-sided clause the most troubling, the court exam-
ined it separately from the others.7' The court was particularly troubled by the
language that set forth the consumer's duty to arbitrate which said "you agree"
that "you will arbitrate," while the other sentences refer to "you and we.",72 The
court notes that although Centennial argued in its brief that both parties were
73bound to arbitrate, the "plain meaning" binds only the customer. The court was
further convinced by the sentence that stated that "most disputes between the par-
ties will be resolved through arbitration, 74 and noted that "[i]f both parties were
required to arbitrate 'any and all disputes' as Centennial claims, then one would
wonder why the contract said that only 'most disputes' not all disputes, are subject
to resolution through arbitration. 7 5 The court rejected Centennial's answer that
the term "most" was used as a qualifier "in order to take into account the possibil-
ity that a customer could, for example, bring a tort suit after randomly being hit
[by a company van]."76
In looking to the applicable Louisiana law, the Iberia court noted that a Lou-
isiana appellate case Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc.7 7 was
"on all fours with the present case.",78 Sutton's involved a standard-form cellular
phone contract, similar to the one in the instant case, which generally required
disputes to be arbitrated but expressly carved out an exception for attempts to
collect debts from the customer, which BellSouth could pursue in court.79 The
court refused to enforce the clause. 8 0 Similarly, the court looked to another Lou-
isiana appellate court case that found a one-sided arbitration clause invalid be-
cause it was written in such small print so as to be considered "unduly burden-
81
some" to the consumer.
The Fifth Circuit examined these two Louisiana appellate cases, and found
82that the district court did not apply different rules. The court also noted that the
decision in the instant case follows in the same footsteps of Banc One Acceptance
68. Id.
69. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th Cir. 2004).





75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 169.
77. 776 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
78. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 2004).
79. Sutton's, 776 So. 2d at 596-97.
80. Id. at 597.
81. Posadas v. Pool Depot, Inc., 858 So. 2d 611, 614 (La. Ct. App. 2003), writ denied, 857 So. 2d
502 (La. 2003).
82. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2004).
[Vol. I
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Corp. v. Hill,83 in which the Fifth Circuit applied a Mississippi unconscionability
holding where the state decision did not appear to discriminate against arbitra-
tion.84
However, none of the other issues raised by other plaintiffs rose to a level to
be considered unconscionable by the court.85 Regarding the claims against both
Cingular and Sprint, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court
for entry of an appropriate order compelling arbitration.
86
First, the court rejected the "fine print" argument that the arbitration clauses
were invalid because they were in small, hard-to-read print.87 The court reasoned
that the type size used for the arbitration clauses was no different than that used
for the rest of the contract.88 Likewise, the court found that although all of the
contracts at issue contained a clause permitting the companies to change the terms
of the agreement, these provisions did not render the agreements illusory or make
the arbitration clause unconscionable. 89 Interestingly, a Louisiana appellate court
had recently determined that a change-in-terms provision did render that con-
tract's arbitration clause one-sided and therefore unconscionable. 90 The Fifth
Circuit, however, declined to follow the Louisiana appellate court's reasoning and
determined that the "notice of the change in terms can be understood as an invita-
tion to enter into a relationship governed by the new terms" and that the arbitra-
tion clause as it stood was not unconscionable.
9
'
Regarding consolidation or class action, the Fifth Circuit found that the provi-
sions barring the arbitrator from ordering such did not leave the plaintiffs without
remedies or oppress them to the extent that the clause would be considered uncon-
scionable. 92 In this discussion, the court diligently noted that "both federal and
Louisiana policy favor arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 93 Moreover,
the court noted that "a highly relevant" factor in their decision was the provision
in the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA) that bars individuals from
bringing class actions. 94 The court concluded that individuals were not oppressed
at an unconscionable level or left entirely without a remedy because LUPTA also
permits the state attorney general to sue on behalf of the state.
95
Lastly, although Cingular's contract included terms stating that the existence
and result of any arbitration must be kept confidential, and the court agreed that
the requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular companies than to the
customers, the court still ruled that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
requirement was "so offensive as to be invalid. 96 Although noting that legal
authority exists for finding confidentiality provisions unconscionable, the court
83. 367 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004).
84. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 170.
85. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 172-74.
86. Id. at 176.
87. Id. at 172.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 173.
90. Id. at 172. See Simpson v. Grimes, 849 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
91. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 173-74 (5th Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 174-75.
93. Id. at 174.
94. Id. at 174-75. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1409 (West 2004).
95. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 175.
96. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004).
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concluded that an attack on the confidentiality provision is "an attack on the char-
acter of arbitration itself., 97 The court adhered to the stance that confidentiality
can help or hurt the plaintiff and refused to find that provision unconscionable. 9
8
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's use
of unconscionability in only one scenario with Centennial-the one-sided arbitra-
tion clause. 99 The court used state law cases to apply general contract principles
to invalidate only the Centennial arbitration clause.' °° The court declined to find
the fine print, change-in-terms clauses, bar on class actions, or required confiden-
tiality aspects of any of the arbitration agreements-between customers and the
remaining two defendants, Cingular and Sprint-unconscionable, even in the
midst of legal support to do so.'O°
V. COMMENT
In Iberia, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the opportunity to use Louisi-
ana contract law in order to find arbitration provisions from various contracts
unconscionable and unenforceable. 10 2  However, only one arbitration clause at
issue-the one-sided agreement with Centennial-managed to shock the con-
science of the court enough for it to be rendered invalid. 0 3 As the opinion opens,
the court appears willing and eager to use unconscionability as a tool to rescue
unassuming plaintiffs from the snares of "unconscionable" arbitration agreements.
However, this generosity abruptly ends when the court, albeit appropriately, flatly
rejects the fine print argument."° The court continues, extolling the benefits of
arbitration while dismissing the bar on class action and confidentiality argu-
ments-both legal issues that are far from settled.10 5 Nevertheless, this seemingly
schizophrenic attitude is simply an example where federal appellate courts find
themselves-caught between the opportunity to affirm lower courts' use of un-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 169.
100. Id. at 166-71.
101. Id. at 171-76.
102. Id. at 171-75. The reasons include: one-sidedness, fine print, change-in-terms clauses, bars on
class actions and confidentiality. See id.
103. Id. at 171.
104. Id. at 172.
105. Id. at 174-76. Regarding the bar on class actions, the court noted the split of authority and
refered to a recent decision within the circuit that "rejected an argument that an arbitration clause
prohibiting plaintiffs from proceeding collectively was unconscionable under Texas law." Id. at 174.
See Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 362 F.3d 294, 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2004). For a case ruling in
the opposite, the court also referenced Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003), Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 2003), affid in part and rev'd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003) wherein the Ninth Circuit concluded that a class-action
ban violates California's unconscionability law. Id. As for confidentiality provisions, the Ting court
also determined that "[allthough facially neutral, confidentiality provisions usually favor companies
over individuals ...if the company succeeds in imposing [the] gag order, plaintiffs are unable to
mitigate the advantages inherent in being a repeat player." 319 F.3d at 1151. See Susan Randall,
Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BuFF. L. REv. 185,
218-219 (2004) (noting that the majority of courts find confidentiality provisions unconscionable and
only a few courts have found otherwise.)
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conscionability to police arbitration agreements, while being careful not to offend
the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance.
The doctrine of unconscionability serves as an interesting tool for courts to
negate arbitration clauses. Unconscionability has existed in contract law for cen-
turies and is widely accepted.10 6 The Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) treat-
ment of unconscionability is perhaps the most famous-although it fails to actu-
ally define the term. 107 The UCC's official comments attempt to give a little more
guidance to the term, stating that in determining unconscionability, a court can
look to whether "the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract ....
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise."' 10 8 Al-
though hard to define, the abundance of case law presents an adequate indicator
for what courts will generally find sufficient for a contract provision to be worthy
of the term "unconscionable."
In Iberia, the Fifth Circuit looked to relevant Louisiana law regarding the the-
ory of unconscionability. 1°9 The court noted that no section of the Louisiana Civil
Code directly addressed the doctrine of unconscionability or adhesionary contracts
in general. 110 Still, the court determined that Louisiana jurisprudence uniformly
recognized that "an unconscionable contract or term can be thought of as lacking
the free consent that the Code requires of all contracts.""' Furthermore, "in order
to be invalidated, a provision must possess features of both adhesionary formation




Therefore, unconscionability serves as a useful tool for courts to take care of
the "little guy." One commentator suggests that, "The Supreme Court's arbitra-
tion jurisprudence, with its emphasis on formal agreement to contract terms, un-
derplays the fairness side of contract law. When the parties . . . have disparate
bargaining power, disparate knowledge, and disparate interests, both the moral
and economic bases of contracting demand attention .... ,3 Unconscionability
allows courts to deal with this dilemma and introduce fairness into contracts that
may have been shockingly unfair in the first place.
Prior to the increase of arbitration agreements after the passage of the FAA,
unconscionability was rarely invoked by courts. 1 4 Interestingly, as the number of
106. Stempel, supra note 2, at 792-93.
107. Id. at 793. Section 2-302 of the UCC reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been un-
conscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may en-
force the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be un-
conscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004).
108. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. n.1.




113. Elizabeth Thornburg, Contracting with Torfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Per-
sonal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 269 (2004).
114. Randall, supra note 104, at 194.
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arbitration agreements rose, so did the use of unconscionability as a means to find
contracts unenforceable.' 5 The doctrine has been praised for its "flexibility and
adaptability to a variety of situations." ' 6 Part of the reason why unconscionabil-
ity works so well is its lack of a formal definition.' 1 7 This gives courts the ability
to apply unconscionability on an ad-hoc basis."l 8 At the same time, this presents
the opportunity for courts to use the doctrine in an unwieldy fashion, increasing
the potential for invalidation based specifically on arbitration provisions, a result
that would fly in the face of Section 2 of the FAA and the rule proscribed in Doc-
tor's Associates. 119
Again, the Supreme Court has not provided much guidance for lower courts
in their "policing" of arbitration agreements.120 Regarding the positive aspects of
the new "situation specific" unconscionability doctrine, it gives courts an oppor-
tunity to examine arbitration clauses on the basis of their fairness to the parties,
which the Supreme Court has left to the discretion of the lower courts. 12 Further,
as this area of law continues to develop, certain provisions of arbitration clauses
that are repeatedly deemed unconscionable create categories that drafters of arbi-
tration clauses can avoid. 122  However, this same "pigeonholing" presents the
potential for a situation in which a court may miss an arbitration clause's funda-
mental unfairness because nothing in its terms matched the list of unconscionabil-
ity indicators.'
23
The Iberia court's decision reflects the dilemma between using unconscion-
ability as a rescue doctrine and staying within the confines of the FAA and the
rule in Doctor's Associates.t 24 In Iberia, the opportunity existed for the court to
push the doctrine of unconscionability to its limits. All the court had to do was
affirm the decisions of the district court, which found that all of the arbitration
agreements were unconscionable for various reasons. 125 However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not go that far. Rather, the court carefully applied state law, as it had in
Banc One, in order to use unconscionability only in the right set of circum-
stances. 126 Of all the challenged clauses in the Iberia decision, the court noted
that only the clause drafted by Centennial possessed "a significant feature that the
115. Id. Randall asserts that:
[1in 2002-2003, litigants raised issues of unconscionability in 235 cases, and courts found con-
tracts or clauses to be unconscionable in 100 of those cases, or 42.5%. Of those 235 cases, 161,
or 68.5%, involved arbitration agreements. Significantly, courts were much more likely to find
arbitration agreements, [compared with] other sorts of contracts, unconscionable. Courts found
50.3% of the arbitration agreements unconscionable, as opposed to 25.6% of other types of con-
tracts.
Id. Although it should be noted that even though federal and state courts in California "decided a
significant number of these cases, a total of seventeen state courts and fifteen federal courts found
provisions in arbitration agreements unconscionable." Id. at 194-95.
116. Id. at 221.
117. Id. at 221-22.
118. Id. at 222.
119. Id. at 222-23.
120. Stempel, supra note 2, at 809.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 810.
123. Id.
124. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
125. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 2004).
126. See Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004).
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others lack" and the court correctly rendered Centennial's one-sided arbitration
clause unconscionable.
12 7
However, regarding the other challenged aspects of the clauses, the court
backed away from its "rescue" mentality. First, regarding the "fine print" argu-
ment, the court noted that while type size would "seem to bear most directly on
the question whether the contracts were formed in an adhesionary manner ... the
type-size argument does not by itself show that the arbitration clause is invalid."
' 128
Interestingly, the court failed to mention the type-size argument from Sutton's, in
which the Louisiana appellate court did determine that the type was small enough
to be considered an aspect of unconscionability.129 Instead, the Iberia court em-
phasized that the arbitration provisions were not printed in any smaller type than
the rest of the contract. 130 The court again repeated, as a safeguard of sorts, that
"[t]he FAA prohibits states from passing statutes that require arbitration clauses to
be displayed with special prominence" (even though this was not even an issue)
and that "courts cannot use unconscionability doctrines to achieve the same re-
sult."' 13 1 Albeit likely decided correctly, the "fine print" argument served as the
turning point in the opinion.
In much the same way, the Fifth Circuit shied away from following a recent
intermediate state appellate court's decision when it failed to agree with the dis-
trict court that the "change-in-terms" clauses did not render the agreements either
illusory or unconscionable. 132 This is significant considering that the court could
have easily followed Simpson in the same way that it followed both Sutton's and
Simpson regarding the one-sided clause. According to the state appellate court in
Simpson, the change-in-terms clause (upon written mailing to the customer), al-
lowed the securities dealer to achieve "through clever subterfuge" a one-sided
arbitration clause. 1
33
The Fifth Circuit not only had before it the ruling in Simpson, but also some
federal cases that invalidated arbitration agreements that give the company the
right to alter the terms of the agreement at any time. 134 Still, the court had noted
earlier that "a decision by an intermediate appellate state court 'is a datum for
ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide
127. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 168.
128. Id. at 172.
129. Id. at 169. See Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589 (2000).
130. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 172.
131. Id.
132. Id. See Simpson v. Grimes, 849 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
133. Simpson, 849 So. 2d at 748.
134. See Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (joining with other circuits
in holding that "an arbitration agreement allowing one party the unfettered right to alter the arbitration
agreement's existence or its scope is illusory"); Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d
306, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that an agreement is illusory when one party has reserved the right
to choose the nature of the forum and alter the applicable rule and procedures without an obligation to
notify the other party); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the promulgation of one-sided rules, including the employer's right to modify the arbitration rules
"in whole or in part" breached the agreement to settle claims via arbitration); Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 1997) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (determining that it
would be "unfair to impose arbitration unilaterally" on one party when the other party retained the
right to alter any of the terms without notice at any time).
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otherwise.""1 35 Apparently the court was "convinced by other persuasive data"
that the Louisiana Supreme Court, if faced with this decision, would not choose to
follow the lead of Simpson, but would choose to enforce the arbitration provisions
even if they contain change-in-terms clauses. The distinguishing factor for the
court in this decision was that the change-in-terms clauses required some sort of
notice to the consumers. 136 The court determined that this was sufficient to pre-
vent the terms of the contract from being considered illusory or unconscionable.'
37
The court chose not to use unconscionability in this circumstance. Although
there was precedent on both sides, it is likely that the court was fearful of offend-
ing Section 2 of the FAA. The court noted the defendant's point that "the econ-
omy is saturated with contracts containing change-in-terms provisions [similar to
those] involved here."' 138 Thus, for the court to strike a change-in-terms clause
that dealt with an arbitration provision, it would need to be prepared to strike all
change-in-terms provisions, since under Section 2 of the FAA a court cannot sin-
gle out arbitration provisions for stricter scrutiny. 139 Not surprisingly, the Fifth
Circuit was not prepared to make such a ruling. However, this seemingly schizo-
phrenic behavior is really an example of the court using unconscionability respon-
sibly. This is an example of the situation that appellate courts, especially federal
appellate courts, find themselves in. They are left to reign in lower court rulings
where unconscionability can tend to run amok, reserving the use of unconscion-
ability for only the most dire circumstances. Unless the Supreme Court gives
some definitive guidance on some of the particulars of these issues, this is the
position in which appellate courts will continue to find themselves. Still, that may
not necessarily be a bad thing. A bright line list of factors in arbitration clauses
that have the potential to be found unconscionable by the Supreme Court could
prove more detrimental than helpful.' 4° At least without particulars from the Su-
preme Court, appellate courts can afford to be more lenient with the doctrine when
they deem it appropriate.
However, with regard to class actions, the Fifth Circuit in Iberia uses an es-
cape hole to avoid this issue. 141 Granted, the court again has little guidance from
the Supreme Court on class-wide arbitration. The Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle 142 to settle the debate over class-
wide arbitration, but failed to do so.143 Although there is authority on both sides
of this debate as well, the Iberia court, in keeping with earlier precedent from
within the circuit, declined to find that the bar on class actions rendered the arbi-
135. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 68 F.3d 922, 928 (5th Cir. 1995)).
136. Id. at 173.
137. Id. at 173-74.
138. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 173 (5th Cir. 2004).
139. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
140. See generally Stempel, supra note 2, at 809-10.
141. See generally Iberia, 379 F.3d at 174-76.
142. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
143. See Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, To Be Announced: Silence from the United States Supreme Court
and Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an Uncertain Future for Class-Wide Arbitration,
2004 J. Disp. RESOL. 259, 266 (2004). In Bazzle, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, vacated
and remanded the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, holding that the language in the
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tration clause invalid.' 44 The court hung its hat on the fact that LUTPA does not
permit individuals to bring class actions, but allows the state attorney general to
sue on behalf of wronged consumers. 145 Here, the court determined that because
the consumers had a remedy available (if the attorney general did choose to inter-
vene), the clause failed to rise to the level of being unconscionable. 46
This is yet another example of the Fifth Circuit's seemingly schizophrenic at-
titude about protecting the unassuming consumer. It seems as if there is more to
the court's argument than what appears in the opinion. If this is the case, the court
should rule definitively on this issue instead of using the LUTPA issue as a means
of bolstering the court's argument. There are currently serious debates about the
merits of class-arbitration. 147 The court touches on the plaintiffs' arguments that
"the bar on collective proceedings has the effect of immunizing the defendants
from low-value claims ... the arbitration clause is therefore not so much an alter-
native method of dispute resolution as it is a system for avoiding liability all to-
gether."' 148 In the end, the court defers to the argument that both federal and Lou-
isiana policy favors arbitration. 149 Furthermore, the court justified the potential
for unfairness saying, "the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available
in any arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration's ability to offer 'simplicity,
informality, and expedition. -15 Because the Fifth Circuit had recently rejected
an argument that an arbitration clause barring class action was unconscionable, the
court found itself bound by this recent precedent.' 5 ' Without examining the pros
and cons of class-arbitration, it can be argued that at least the Fifth Circuit has
made a definitive ruling on the subject that a bar on class actions will not rise to
the level of unconscionability for the court to strike it.152 However, considering
the national scope of arbitration agreements (especially regarding consumer con-
tracts), it is unnerving for the Ninth Circuit to have a completely different rule of
law, where an arbitration agreement's bar on class-wide relief is considered un-
conscionable under California law. 53 Therefore, definitive guidance from the
Supreme Court-at least regarding class-wide arbitration-would be helpful.
By the time the Iberia court reached the discussion regarding confidentiality
in arbitration, it appears it had become decidedly pro-arbitration. The court over-
turned the district court's decision, finding that "[wihile the confidentiality re-
quirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to [the] cus-
tomer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as
144. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004).
145. Id. at 174-75.
146. Id. at 175.
147. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Mandatory Arbitration: Using Arbitration to
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 75, 85-99 (2004) (finding bars on class actions in arbitration clauses problematic on
various levels including ineffective administrative enforcement actions and lack of feasibility for
consumers to pursue remedy individually and discussing the argument that class action prohibitions are
economically efficient).
148. Id. at 174.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. See Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 362 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 2004).
152. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 174-75.
153. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003), affd in part and rev'd in part, 319
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003).
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to be invalid."1 54 The court took offense to the challenge regarding the confiden-
tiality clause, calling it an "attack on the character of arbitration itself." 155 Curi-
ously, there is significant authority finding confidentiality provisions unconscion-
able. 5 6 Still, the Fifth Circuit's claws came out in defense of the merits of arbitra-
tion when it dismissed confidentiality provisions as being unconscionable. Again,
the court noted that "part of the point of arbitration is that one 'trades the proce-
dures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality
and expedition of arbitration."",157 The court, citing authority from the mid-1980s
that is far from settled today, (perhaps not surprisingly) chose to err on the side of
arbitration in favor of the Supreme Court's stance.
58
When contrasting the decision to use unconscionability for rendering the one-
sided arbitration clause in Centennial's contract void with the resistance of the
court to find any of the other clauses unenforceable, two very distinct voices
emerged. On the one hand, upon finding that the one-sided arbitration clause was
unconscionable, the Iberia court appeared eager to come to the rescue of individu-
als who unknowingly found themselves in these agreements. On the other hand,
throughout the rest of the opinion, the court seemed to adhere rigidly to a pro-
arbitration stance and reluctant to extend that generosity to any other provisions.
Still, if the court wanted to show that they were not afraid to use unconscionabil-
ity, while still maintaining some measure of reasonableness and affinity toward
arbitration, this was really the only position the court could take.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a means of countering the pro-arbitration stance taken by the Supreme
Court, a number of lower courts have chosen to use the doctrine of unconscion-
ability as a means of policing the fairness of arbitration clauses in contracts.
59
The Supreme Court has authorized the use of contract law principles-including
unconscionability-to invalidate arbitration agreements.1 6°  Unconscionability
provides courts with a means of coming to the rescue of parties who, if the court is
sufficiently shocked, are entangled in unfair arbitration clauses. The Fifth Circuit,
in Iberia, had the opportunity to expand the use of the unconscionability doctrine
as a means of undermining arbitration. However, the court chose to only apply
the doctrine in what they considered the worst circumstances.
MARY JANE GROFF
154. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004).
155. Id.
156. See Randall, supra note 105, at 218-19 (noting that the majority of courts have found confidenti-
ality provisions that require the arbitration proceedings and award both be kept confidential uncon-
scionable and that only a few courts have found otherwise).
157. Id. at 176.
158. Id. (referencing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
159. Stempel, supra note 2, at 802.
160. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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